Eliminate Social Security wage cap entirely. Raises ~$3.2T over 10 years.
Published score -$3,200.0B; this estimate is 0.0% away (calibrated reference). Calibrated to reproduce -$3.20T (Social Security Trustees) — agreement is by construction, not an independent test.
Typical error for this kind of policy: -$3,795.2B to -$2,604.8B, from 8 out-of-sample payroll cases.
Out-of-sample accuracy, payroll: 8 pre-registered rows miss their published scores by 18.6% on average (median 16.4%), worst 34.6% — 4 of the 8 fall inside the average. On this figure that is -$3,795.2B to -$2,604.8B typical, -$4,307.2B to -$2,092.8B at the worst row. Read off the out-of-sample tier only — not the calibrated tiers, whose agreement is by construction. It is the observed spread of this model against published scores for this class of policy, not a confidence interval.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Deficit, conventional | Macro feedback | Debt service | Deficit, dynamic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$58.7B | -$12.8B | -$274.1B |
| 2027 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$69.8B | -$25.6B | -$275.8B |
| 2028 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$62.6B | -$38.4B | -$295.8B |
| 2029 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$50.1B | -$51.2B | -$321.1B |
| 2030 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$37.8B | -$64.0B | -$346.2B |
| 2031 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$27.5B | -$76.8B | -$369.3B |
| 2032 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$19.6B | -$89.6B | -$390.0B |
| 2033 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$13.7B | -$102.4B | -$408.7B |
| 2034 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$9.5B | -$115.2B | -$425.7B |
| 2035 | +$320.0B | -$320.0B | -$6.5B | -$128.0B | -$441.5B |
| Income group | Returns | Average change | Share of income | Share of total | Paying more | Paying less | Tax rate before | Tax rate after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lowest Quintile | 62.8M | $0 | 0.00% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Second Quintile | 35.4M | $0 | 0.00% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.8% | 5.8% |
| Middle Quintile | 26.0M | $0 | 0.00% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.3% | 8.3% |
| Fourth Quintile | 16.8M | $0 | 0.00% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.2% | 11.2% |
| Top Quintile | 20.3M | +$24,019 | 4.82% | 100.0% | 61.7% | 0.0% | 20.3% | 24.1% |
Approximate bracket method: this policy cannot run through the return-level microsimulation, so read the shape as directional rather than as a validated table. Groups are ranked by adjusted gross income per return. Average change is in dollars per return; positive means the group pays more tax.
| Fiscal year | GDP level | Jobs | Unemployment | 10-year rate | GDP change, deficit | Interest, deficit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | -0.838% | -537K | +0.42 pt | -0.03 pt | +$58.7B | -$12.8B |
| 2027 | -0.997% | -638K | +0.50 pt | -0.07 pt | +$69.8B | -$25.6B |
| 2028 | -0.894% | -572K | +0.45 pt | -0.10 pt | +$62.6B | -$38.4B |
| 2029 | -0.716% | -458K | +0.36 pt | -0.14 pt | +$50.1B | -$51.2B |
| 2030 | -0.540% | -346K | +0.27 pt | -0.17 pt | +$37.8B | -$64.0B |
| 2031 | -0.393% | -252K | +0.20 pt | -0.21 pt | +$27.5B | -$76.8B |
| 2032 | -0.279% | -179K | +0.14 pt | -0.24 pt | +$19.6B | -$89.6B |
| 2033 | -0.195% | -125K | +0.10 pt | -0.27 pt | +$13.7B | -$102.4B |
| 2034 | -0.135% | -86K | +0.07 pt | -0.31 pt | +$9.5B | -$115.2B |
| 2035 | -0.093% | -59K | +0.05 pt | -0.34 pt | +$6.5B | -$128.0B |
FRB/US-Lite (Federal Reserve calibrated). Demand effects fade over five to seven years as monetary policy responds; there is no supply-side channel. The dynamic score is the conventional score, plus the deficit effects of the GDP change and of interest on the debt: -$3,200.0B + $355.7B - $704.0B = -$3,548.3B.
| Model | Ten-year deficit effect | Method |
|---|---|---|
| CBO-Style | -$3,200.0B | Static + ETI behavioral response + optional FRB/US dynamic feedback |
| TPC-Microsim Pilot | Cannot score this | OASDI wage-cap / donut-hole reforms are not in the microsim tax calculator (NIIT-only payroll edges may map in a later sprint). |
No pilot model returned distributional output; the comparison is aggregate-only.
CBO-Style is the model behind the headline above. The TPC-style microsimulation is a pilot: where the two disagree, the gap tells you how much the answer depends on method. It is not an official range.
Cite asWilse-Samson, Laurence. “Eliminate SS Cap.” Fiscal Policy Calculator, CBO February 2026 baseline, FY2026-2035. https://fiscal.lwilsesamson.com/explore/ss-cap-eliminate