Lower exemption to $3.5M, raise rate to 45%. Raises ~$450B over 10 years.
Published score -$450.0B; this estimate is 0.0% away (calibrated reference). Calibrated to reproduce -$450B (JCT letter on the 'For the 99.5 Percent Act…) — agreement is by construction, not an independent test.
No out-of-sample band: no pre-registered row scores an estate-tax reform. The 44 pre-registered Tier 1 rows are the only tier that measures this model's accuracy, and none of them scores a policy of this kind.
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Deficit, conventional | Macro feedback | Debt service | Deficit, dynamic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$7.9B | -$1.8B | -$38.9B |
| 2027 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$9.1B | -$3.6B | -$39.5B |
| 2028 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$7.8B | -$5.4B | -$42.6B |
| 2029 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$6.1B | -$7.2B | -$46.1B |
| 2030 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$4.4B | -$9.0B | -$49.6B |
| 2031 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$3.1B | -$10.8B | -$52.7B |
| 2032 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$2.2B | -$12.6B | -$55.4B |
| 2033 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$1.5B | -$14.4B | -$57.9B |
| 2034 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$1.0B | -$16.2B | -$60.2B |
| 2035 | +$45.0B | -$45.0B | -$0.7B | -$18.0B | -$62.3B |
The distribution engine cannot yet represent this kind of policy household by household (for example estate tax, tariffs, international or enforcement provisions). An all-zero table would look flat and be wrong, so none is shown.
| Fiscal year | GDP level | Jobs | Unemployment | 10-year rate | GDP change, deficit | Interest, deficit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | -0.113% | -72K | +0.06 pt | -0.00 pt | +$7.9B | -$1.8B |
| 2027 | -0.130% | -83K | +0.06 pt | -0.01 pt | +$9.1B | -$3.6B |
| 2028 | -0.112% | -72K | +0.06 pt | -0.01 pt | +$7.8B | -$5.4B |
| 2029 | -0.087% | -56K | +0.04 pt | -0.02 pt | +$6.1B | -$7.2B |
| 2030 | -0.063% | -41K | +0.03 pt | -0.02 pt | +$4.4B | -$9.0B |
| 2031 | -0.045% | -29K | +0.02 pt | -0.03 pt | +$3.1B | -$10.8B |
| 2032 | -0.031% | -20K | +0.02 pt | -0.03 pt | +$2.2B | -$12.6B |
| 2033 | -0.021% | -13K | +0.01 pt | -0.04 pt | +$1.5B | -$14.4B |
| 2034 | -0.014% | -9K | +0.01 pt | -0.04 pt | +$1.0B | -$16.2B |
| 2035 | -0.009% | -6K | +0.00 pt | -0.05 pt | +$0.7B | -$18.0B |
FRB/US-Lite (Federal Reserve calibrated). Demand effects fade over five to seven years as monetary policy responds; there is no supply-side channel. The dynamic score is the conventional score, plus the deficit effects of the GDP change and of interest on the debt: -$450.0B + $43.8B - $99.0B = -$505.2B.
| Model | Ten-year deficit effect | Method |
|---|---|---|
| CBO-Style | -$450.0B | Static + ETI behavioral response + optional FRB/US dynamic feedback |
| TPC-Microsim Pilot | Cannot score this | Estate and gift tax are outside the individual income microsim. |
No pilot model returned distributional output; the comparison is aggregate-only.
CBO-Style is the model behind the headline above. The TPC-style microsimulation is a pilot: where the two disagree, the gap tells you how much the answer depends on method. It is not an official range.
Cite asWilse-Samson, Laurence. “Biden Estate Reform.” Fiscal Policy Calculator, CBO February 2026 baseline, FY2026-2035. https://fiscal.lwilsesamson.com/explore/estate-exemption-3-5m